EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.5(c)

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## APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO DATE: 29-Aug-2012

SIRIA-ISRAEL: Large-Scale movements of Islaell
and Syrian forces apparently have occurred along
the Syrian front over the past few days.
heavy traf-
fic of Israeli tanks and wheeled vehicles near Al
Qunaytirah on the evening of December 12. Additional
movements of Israeli tanks and artillery were ob-
served west of Syrian-held Sasa that same evening.
The next night, large-scale
movements of Syrian vehicles opposite Al Qunaytirah
and near Sasa on both sides of the Israeli salient
into Syria.
Substantial Israeli and Syrian forces are
already stationed in the areas of the reported move-
ments, and it is not known whether the sightings
represent a redeployment of forces there or an aug-
mentation of them. For the past week,
Syria has been put-
ting its civilian and military forces on a wartime
footing. significant
Syrian troop movements have occurred along the Golan
front and that Syrian forces there have been rein-
forced. The reported Israeli troop movements may
be in reaction to the Syrian activity.

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ISRAEL - ARAB STATES: The Israeli cabinet held an unusually long special session yesterday, presumably working on the government's negotiating strategy for the initial phase of the Geneva peace conference that opens Tuesday. No final decisions were made. A government spokesman announced that another session would be held tomorrow.

The Israeli public is skeptical about the prospects for peace
A substantial number
continue to hold that the Arab goal remains the annihilation of Israel and not just the return of territory lost by the Arabs in the 1967 war.  many Israelis have,
nevertheless, adopted a wait-and-see attitude and appear resigned to Israel's making some concessions at Geneva.
the uncertainty about the prospects for peace is adversely affecting the morale of Israeli troops, particularly reservists. They are concerned about a possible date for their release from military service.  Israeli soldiers fear that Israel will be pres- sured at a peace conference into giving up the fruits of victory in two wars with nothing in re- turn.  Israel's military leadership does not seek renewed warfare and views the Geneva conference as desirable.

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SYRIA:	Asad's	Position	on	the	Eve	of	Negotiations

As the Geneva peace talks approach, Pre Asad's hold on power appears to be fairly fi war has bolstered his popularity at home, an probably count at present on the backing of supporters, in many cases hand-picked, in th forces, the security apparatus, and the Syri Party. Equally important to him is the cont loyalty of an elite 10,000-man special secur force commanded by his brother.	rm. The d he can key e armed an Baath inuing
	·•····································
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	<u></u>
	As the
peace talks drag outas they almost certain Asad is likely to have his hands full keepin damper on Syrian jingoism, if he does not lopatience with the Israelis himself.	ga
(conti	nued)
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Since taking full control of the government in 1970 Asad has had to fend against the subversive activities of conservative and leftist exiles in Beirut, right-wing Baath exiles in Baghdad, and other rival claimants to power residing in Syrian jails, all of whom have some supporters in the army or the Syrian Baath Party. Perhaps even more importantly, many members of the majority Sunni Muslim sect in Syria bitterly resent the predominant position of Asad's own much smaller Alawite sect. Although Sunnis such as the minister of defense, the foreign minister, and the minister of interior hold high positions, there is still a lot of unhappiness among Sunnis about the disproportionate number of Alawites who hold influential government posts and army commands.

(continued)

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## FOR THE RECORD\*

Saudi Arabia:	·
	Oil Minister Yamani
was to re	eturn to Saudi Arabia from the
	ole because King Faysal wants
	ence of Arab foreign and oil
ministers at the end	
Japan - South I	Korea : The annual ministerial
conference postnone	ed earlier this year when Korean
opposition leader K	Im Tae-chung was kidnaped in
Tokyo has again hee	en delayed. Tokyo now says the
talks cannot be held	until after the Diet recesses
	use of domestic political con-
siderations.	the or dowerence borrerour con
sideracions.	
Sudan, Kharto	ım University students who seized
control of the campi	is on December 10 ended their
domonetration quiet	ly on December 13 after negotia-
tions with university	ty officials. The students, ap-
namently worm down	by their sit-in, during which
parencry worn down	the campus, capitulated to the
police coldoned off	aving terms. These included re-
government's race-so	politically activist Students
Instatement of the	anded after disorders in September,
Union that was disp	anded after disorders in beptember,
	s agreement to consider other
student grievances.	

\*These items were prepared by CIA without consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.

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